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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY CASES
Dean Eileen Kaufman'
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
I thought that was certainly one of the most stirring discussions
emotionally and intellectually that I have heard in some time.
From all of this high drama, we now have to move to the rest of
the cases that are at least worthy of some discussion, and, of
course, that leaves Professor Kaufman and myself. It is my
pleasure to introduce the Vice Dean of this law school, who is a
lecturer on Constitutional Law, and, of course, I have got to
make this personal. Those of you who know that I am the chair
of Pattern Jury Instructions2 will now know, if you have not
known it, that the editor and reporter for volume two is Professor
Kaufman. She is frequently a lecturer before judicial bodies on a
variety of subjects, but she has particular interest in at least a
couple of cases that she is now going to discuss. It is my
pleasure to present to you Vice Dean Eileen Kaufinan.
Dean Eileen Kaufman:
Thank you. Leon always asks me to speak late in the day,
which I never mind, but following Leon Friedman makes it very
difficult.
The four cases that Leon asked me to discuss do not fit neatly
within one category, nor do they suggest any particular unifying
Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center. B.A., Skidmore College, 1970; J.D., New York University, 1975
L.L.M., New York University, 1992. In addition to serving as Vice Dean and
Professor of Law at Touro Law Center, Dean Kaufman has been a Managing
Attorney at Westchester Legal Services, Inc. and serves on the New York
State Bar Association President's Committee on Access to Justice, and is
Reporter for the New York Pattern Jury Instructions. She has published
primarily in the area of civil rights law.
2 LEON D. LAZER, PATrERN JURY INSTRUcTIONS (3d ed. 1997).
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theme. Robinson v. Shell Oil 3 is a statutory case that resolves
the issue of whether a former employee can bring a retaliation
claim under Title VI, 4 the employment discrimination statute.
The next case, Clinton v. Jones,' while also, in a sense, a
discrimination case, resolves the issue of whether there is
presidential immunity from civil suits based on actions taken
before assuming office. 6 The third case, Bracy v. Gramley, '
while also involving misconduct by one in high office, resolves
the question of whether a criminal defendant has a due process
right to a trial by an unbiased judge.8 Finally, M. L. B. v. S. L.
J.,9 while also involving due process, resolves the question of
whether an indigent parent can be deprived of the right to appeal
the termination of her parental rights due to an inability to pay the
required costs. 1
The first of the four cases is Robinson v. Shell Oil." In
Robinson, a unanimous Court held that for purposes of a
retaliation suit under Title VII, the word employee includes
former employee.12 More specifically, the issue was whether a
former employee could bring suit under Title VII for post
employment action allegedly taken in retaliation for the employee
having filed a discrimination suit under Title VI.'3  In 1991,
Shell Oil fired the petitioner who had worked for the company for
s 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1997). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits
discrimination in employment with respect to race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. Id.
5 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
6 Id. at 1644. "[W] e have never suggested that the President, or any other
official, has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in
an official capacity." Id.
7 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997).
8 Id. at 1797.
9 117 S. Ct. 555 (1997).10 Id. at 559.
11 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
12 Id. at 849.
" Id. at 845.
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years as a territorial sales representative. 4 He filed a charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter
"EEOC"] claiming that the discharge was based on racial
discrimination. While that charge was pending, he applied for a
new job with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, who asked
Shell Oil for a job reference and gave Shell Oil a questionnaire to
complete. 16 Shell Oil completed the questionnaire, indicating that
the petitioner had not left his job voluntarily and that if the
opportunity presented itself Shell Oil would not rehire him.' 7
Additionally, with respect to nine different categories, Shell
reported that petitioner's performance was below average and his
attendance was poor."
Robinson learned about this job reference and thereupon filed a
second charge of discrimination in which he claimed that the
negative reference was in retaliation for his having filed his
original Title VII race discrimination claim.' 9 His retaliation
claim was based on a provision of Title VII, section 704A,'
which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
employees or applicants who have availed themselves in some
way of Title VHI's protection.2 The district court dismissed his
claim concluding that the section does not cover former
14 Id. See Court Looks at Civil Rights Provision, UNITED PRESS INT'L, BC
Cycle, Nov. 6, 1996 (stating that Mr. Robinson had served for twelve years as
a territorial sales representative in Shell's Mid-Atlantic retail marketing
district).
15 Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 845.
16 Id.
" See supra note 14.
18 Id.
19 Robinson v. Shell Oil, 70 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
843 (1997).
20 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1997). Section 2000e-3(a) of Title VII
provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment.., because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation or hearing under this
subehapter." Id.
21 Robinson, 70 F.3d at 327; 42 U.S.C. 2000e (f )(1997). Section 2000e (f)
of Title VII defines "employee" as an "individual employed by an
employer...." Id.
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employees?2 The Fourth Circuit reversed, but upon re-hearing
en banc, the panel's decision was vacated and the district court's
determination that former employees may not bring suit under
§ 704A for retaliation was affirmed?23
The Fourth Circuit's ruling was contrary to decisions from the
Second Circuit,24 the Third Circuit,25 the Tenth Circuit, 26 and the
Eleventh Circuit,27 which all had held that the term employees did
22 Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 845.
3 Id.
2' See Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that plaintiff may be able to state a claim for retaliation, even though
no longer employed with the defendant company, if the employer "blacklists"
the plaintiff, wrongfully refuses to write a recommendation, or sullies the
plaintiff's reputation); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 85 F.3d
89 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the term "employee" includes former
employee as long as the alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of the
employment relationship); Patchenko v. C.B. Dolge, 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir.
1978) (holding that although plaintiff was no longer employed by defendant,
she was an "employee" for the purposes of maintaining an action under Title
VII for discrimination on the basis of sex).
I See Kachmar v. Sungard, 109 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a
former employee stated prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation under
Title VII); Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
a former employee has standing to bring a retaliation suit under § 704);
Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a
teacher no longer employed by school district was deemed an "employee" for
the purpose of bringing an action under Title VII when the school district
sought revocation of her teaching license in alleged retaliation for her having
filed a Title VII claim).
26 See Berry v. Stevenson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a former employee who quit his job after eleven years of employment was
entitled to bring a Title VII constructive discharge suit on the basis of race
discrimination); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162
(10th Cir. 1977) (holding that plaintiff could not be precluded from bringing
an action under Title VII for retaliatory discharge based on sex discrimination
just because she had voluntarily terminated her employment several months
prior).
27 See Sherman v. Burke Contracting Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a black former employee could maintain an action against former
employer for persuading new employer to discharge him in retaliation for his
filing a Title VII complaint that he was fired for marrying a white woman);
Bailey v. U.S.X. Corp., 850 F.2d .1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
[Vol 14
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include former employees. 28 At oral argument in the Supreme
Court, before the petitioner's attorney could even begin his
argument, he was questioned about the practical effect of the
relief he was seeking.29 Chief Justice Rehnquist said that if
Robinson prevailed, an EEOC complaint would be "[a] sure way
to make sure you don't get a bad reference even though the firing
[was] completely justified. "30 Justice Scalia added, that if
someone planned to quit, it would also be prudent to file an
EEOC complaint regardless of the circumstances in order to
prevent a negative job reference in the future.31
Despite the concerns raised during the oral argument, a
unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas,
concluded in rather short order that the word employee, while
ambiguous, should be interpreted to include former employees.32
The Court reasoned that that definition is more consistent with the
broader context of Title VII and with the primary purpose of the
anti-retaliation provision.33 Justice Thomas relied primarily on
the position advanced by his former agency, the EEOC.3 The
EEOC argued that the exclusion of former employees from the
protection of § 704A, would undermine the effectiveness of Title
VII by allowing the threat of post employment retaliation to deter
victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC. 35 It
would also provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire
former employee has standing to bring a Title VII action against his former
employer for making adverse comments to a prospective employer in
retaliation for former employee's previous sex discrimination suit).
I Holland & Hart LP, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Leads to New Concerns
Regarding Employee References, COLORADO EMPLOYiENT LAW LErrER,
Apr. 1997.
2 Robinson v. Shell Oil, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 656475, at *4 (U.S. Oral
Arg. 1996).
3 Id.
31 Id.
32 Robinson v. Shell Oil, 117 S. Ct. 843, 849 (1997).33 Id.
31Id. at 848.
35 Id.
1998 437
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employees who might bring Title VII claims.36 While this
unanimous decision appears relatively non-controversial and
straightforward, it has sent shivers down the collective spines of
employers who now fear that any time they issue a negative
reference for a discharged employee who has claimed race or
gender discrimination, they may be inviting another Title VII
claim.37
The qualified immunity from defamation suits that employers
enjoy with respect to job references for prior employees will not
insulate them from potential liability in a retaliation suit brought
under Title VII. 38  There was an article that appeared in the
Colorado Employment Law Letter9" that warns employers about
this danger and posits the following scenario.40 An employee is
fired, and then the employee falsely claims that he or she was
fired because of race or gender discrimination, when in fact it
was because of poor job performance.41 Then, an employer
truthfully provides a negative reference for the employee and the
employee sues employer for unlawful retaliation.42  The
Employment Law Letter asks, "what is an employer to do?"
43
Apparently what some employers have chosen to do is to adopt a
no-comment policy, whereby they simply refuse to offer any job
reference when asked in order to prevent this problem."
36 Id. (citing Amici Brief for United States and EEOC at 8, Robinson v. Shell
Oil, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997)(No. 95-1376)).37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Holland & Hart, LLP, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Leads to New
Concerns Regarding Employee References, COLORADO EMPLOYMENT LAW
LETTER, Apr., 1997 (commenting on the potential impact of the Robinson
decision).
4 id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 Id. Another option is for the employer to provide a neutral reference
which gives only the most basic employment information, unless the employee
signs a complete release against claims. Id. Even if the employee is willing to
sign such a release, the Letter suggests that the employer take care to be
truthful and accurate, and consistent in. the amount of detail supplied. Id.
438 [Vol 14
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 14 [1998], No. 2, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/11
DISCRIMINATION CASES
The next case, Clinton v. Jones,4 was one of the most closely
watched cases of the term. As virtually the whole world knows
by now, Paula Jones brought an action against President Clinton
containing state and federal law claims arising from an incident
that occurred before President Clinton took office, but while he
was still Governor of Arkansas.4 She alleges that he made
abhorrent sexual advances, which she rejected."
Among the claims raised against Clinton were civil rights claims
that his conduct deprived her of federally protected rights, and
that Clinton and a former state trooper allegedly conspired to
deprive her of her federally guaranteed rights, and common law
tort claims, that Clinton's conduct constituted intentional
infliction of emotional distress, as well as defamation.48 With the
possible exception of the defamation claim, all of the conduct
alleged occurred before Clinton assumed the office of President.
President Clinton fied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
presidential immunity, requesting the court to dismiss the action
without prejudice and to toll the statute of limitations until he is
no longer President, at which time the plaintiff could re-file her
action. 49 The district court denied the motion, ordered discovery
to proceed, but also ordered any trial stayed until the end of the
President's term. Both parties appealed.50 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, but reversed the
45 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
46 Id. at 1639. Mr. Clinton was Governor of Arkansas from 1979 to 1981
and from 1983 to 1992. Kenneth J. Garcia, Arkansas Under Clinton: Clinton
Learned From 1980 Election Loss, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, October
9, 1992, at Al.
I Id. at 1640. Ms. Jones further claimed that after she rejected these
advances, her "superiors at work... dealt with her in a hostile and rude
manner, and changed her duties to punish her for rejecting those advances."
Id.
11 Id. Jones claimed that Clinton "acting under color of law deprived her of
[her] rights [under] Rev. Stat. § 1979 [and] 42 U.S.C. § 1983," and conspired
with the trooper to violate her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1980 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. Id.49 Id. at 1640.
SId. at 1641.
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order that stayed the trial.5" Somewhat surprisingly, a unanimous
United States Supreme Court affirmed 52with Justice Stevens
delivering the opinion for the court,53 and Justice Breyer writing a
very interesting concurring opinion.'
We should note a couple of issues that the Court did not decide
in this case. First was whether immunity would attach if the suit
were brought in state, rather than federal court. 55  That would
implicate questions of federalism as opposed to separation of
powers. Second was whether a court could compel the
attendance of the President at any specific time and place.56 On
that issue, the Court assumed that there would be no necessity for
the President to attend in person unless he wanted to, and that his
testimony could be taken at the White House at a time that would
accommodate his schedule.57 The issue decided by the Court was
whether the Constitution affords the President temporary
immunity from civil damage suits arising out of events that
occurred before he took office.58
In rejecting Clinton's claim of immunity, the Court noted that
the rationale for immunity from suits for damages arising out of
official duties, is not applicable to unofficial conduct. 59  The
Court said that the public interest is served by enabling officials
51 Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that staying the appeal
would be the "functional equivalent of a grant of temporary immunity," and
thus reversed that order. Id.521d. at 1652.
3 Id. at 1639.
' Id. at 1652. (Breyer, J., concurring).
55 Id. at 1642.
56Id. at 1643.
51 Id. The Court noted that "[a] Ilthough Presidents have responded to written
interrogatories, given depositions, and provided videotaped trial
testimony... no sitting President has ever testified, or been ordered to testify,
in open court." Id. at 1643 n.14.
58 Id. at 1639. Prior to Mr. Clinton, only three other sitting Presidents were
defendants in civil cases concerning their actions before assuming office. Two
of them, Teddy Roosevelt and Harry Truman, had their cases dismissed prior
to taking office. The third, President Kennedy, settled a case while he was in
office arising from an auto accident. Id. at 1643.59 Id. at 1643.
440 [Vol 14
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to carry out their functions unimpeded by the threat that a
particular decision may gave rise to personal liability.: Indeed,
that was the basis for the Court's decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
61 where the Court held that a former President was entitled to
absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his
official acts.6 The essential concern was to avoid rendering the
President unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties.'
That rationale simply does not support a grant of immunity for
unofficial conduct, and everyone in the case agreed that the
conduct alleged here was clearly unofficial.?
History figured prominently in the arguments of this case, with
President Clinton relying on President Jefferson's protest of a
subpoena in the Aaron Burr treason trial, and statements made by
Vice President John Adams that the President is not subject to
any process whatsoever.6 Justice Stevens, quoting Justice
Jackson said,
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have
envisioned had they foreseen modem conditions, must be
divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams
6 id.
61 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (granting absolute immunity for official acts of
President Nixon that may have been unlawfully retaliatory in authorization of
the dismissal of a Department of Air Force employee who had previously
testified before Congress to the embarrassment of the Government).
6 Id. at 755. The Court stated that "[i]n view of the special nature of the
President's constitutional office and functions, we think it appropriate to
recognize absolute Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within
the 'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility." Id. at 756.
Id. at 744-45. The Court stated:
In the absence of immunity... executive officials would
hesitate to exercise their discretion in a way "injuriously
affect[ing] the claims of particular individuals," even when
the public interest required bold and unhesitating action.
Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore
compelled a judicial recognition of immunity from suits
arising from official acts.
Id. (citation omitted).
6 Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1640.
OId. at 1644-45.
1998
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Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharoah. A century
and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation
yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt
quotations from respected sources on each side. 6
That is reminiscent of Judge Harold Leventhal's observation that
relying on legislative history is like "looking out over a crowd of
people like this and picking out your friends." 67
Based on the text and the structure of the Constitution, the
Court agreed with President Clinton's initial premise that the
presidency is a unique office.6 ' Nevertheless, the Court rejected
his separation of powers argument.69  Clinton argued that
separation of powers principles would be violated by allowing the
civil action to proceed, because it would interfere with his ability
to carry out and perform his official duties.70 However, the
Court found that history did not support his prediction, because in
more than two hundred years only three sitting Presidents had
ever been subjected to suit for non-official conduct, and it had not
posed a problem.71 Further, the Court concluded that separation
of powers does not prohibit one branch from having any control
over the acts of another. 72 The Court said that "[t]he fact that a
61Id. at 1645.
67 See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983).
68 117 S. Ct. at 1646-47. "[T]he doctrine of separation of powers places
limits on the authority of the Federal Judiciary to interfere with the Executive
Branch that would be transgressed by allowing this action." Id. at 1647. See
also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. This Article provides in pertinent part: "The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States .... " Id.
69 Id. at 1647. "It does not follow, however, that separation of powers
principles would be violated by allowing this action to
proceed .... Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core
Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies." Id. at 1647-48.
70 Id. at 1648. See also Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996)
(stating that "the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not
impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties.").
7 1d. at 1648.
' Id. at 1648-49. "[S]eparation of powers does not mean that the branches
'ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other."
Id. at 1648 (citation omitted).
442 [Vol 14
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federal court's exercise of its traditional Article Three jurisdiction
may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief
Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the
Constitution."'
The Court relied on two principles, both attributed to Chief
Justice John Marshall. The first principle, which has its origin in
Marbury v. Madison 4 is that the Supreme Court is the ultimate
arbiter of the Constitution.' The Court clearly has the power to
determine whether the President has acted within the law.76 A
modem application of that principle is Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 7' where the Supreme Court decided that President
Truman had exceeded his constitutional authority in ordering a
seizure of the steel mills. 78 The second principle that the Court
relied on is that the President is subject to judicial process in
certain circumstances. 79 The historical example is when Chief
Justice Marshall presided over the Aaron Burr treason trial and
ruled that a subpoena could be directed to the President.o The
modem counterpart, of course, is United States v. Nixon,"' where
the Court held that President Nixon was obligated to comply with
the subpoena requiring him to produce the infamous tape
recordings in the Oval Office. 82
Drawing on these two principles the Court concluded that "if
the judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by
reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct,
and... direct appropriate process to the President himself,
[then] the federal courts have power to determine the legality of
Id. at 1648-49.
74 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
75 Id. at 180.
76 Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1649.
77 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
78 Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1649.
79 Id. at 1649.
0 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (Va. 1807).
8' 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
8 Id. at 713 (holding that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the
generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.").
1998 443
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his unofficial conduct." 3 Thus, the Court held "that the doctrine
of separation of powers does not require the federal courts to stay
all private actions against the President until he leaves office." 84
Having found that the Constitution does not require the issuance
of a stay, the Supreme Court went on to review whether or not
the district court's order staying the trial was an abuse of
discretion.8 While noting that federal courts have broad
discretion with respect to managing their dockets and scheduling
their cases, the Court nevertheless concluded that it was an abuse
of discretion to stay the trial until after the President leaves office
because the district court was not yet in a position to assess
whether or not the trial would interfere with the President's
duties.
Finally, the Court dismissed as insubstantial two concerns that
had been raised by the President: first, that this decision could
generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and
frivolous litigation86; and second, the danger that national security
concerns might prevent the President from explaining why he
would need a stay. 87 The Court said that if Congress believes that
the President needs more protection, there is nothing to prevent
Congress from enacting legislation providing for the deferral of
litigation in order to accommodate the President's concerns.
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed
1) that the Constitution offers no automatic immunity in cases like
this, and 2) that the district court's order staying the trial was
83 Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1650.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. (stating that the risk of frivolous litigation is not serious because "most
frivolous and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or on
summary judgment, with little if any personal involvement by the
defendant.").
I Id. The Court stated that the district courts traditionally accommodate the
President's needs by giving "the utmost deference to Presidential
responsibilities." Id. at 1652. In addition, the Court noted that several
Presidents have given testimony without jeopardizing the Nation's security.
Id.
I Id. at 1652. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.§ 362 (providing that litigation against
debtor stayed upon filing of bankruptcy petition).
444 [Vol 14
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premature. 9 However, in a thoughtful, and in my view,
persuasive opinion, Justice Breyer explains how the Constitution
prohibits a federal judge from interfering with the President's
discharge of his official duties. 9° He emphasizes the fact that
Article II vests the entire "Executive power" in a single
individual, which makes that branch of government very different
from Congress and from the judiciary.9' Congress can sit and
function, even if up to half of its members are absent.9' The
judiciary can function even if it means designating judges from
other circuits to sit.93  However, in Justice Breyer's view,
interference with the President's ability to carry out his public
responsibilities is constitutionally equivalent to interference with
the ability of the entire Congress or the judicial branch to carry
out their public obligation.9' Further, Justice Breyer is not nearly
as sanguine as is the majority about the ability of federal judges to
rely on case management techniques in order to prevent
interference with the President's performance of his duties.
Instead, Justice Breyer predicted that there will be a need for
S9 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority which held that in
order to obtain a postponement of a civil law suit against him, the President
must" bear the burden of establishing a need.").
I Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
91 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). The intention of the Founders in vesting
Executive Authority in one person was to focus executive responsibility
thereby facilitating accountability and encouraging energetic, decisive and
speedy execution of the laws. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). See, e.g.. JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 144 (J. Gough ed. 1947)
(desirability of a Perpetual Executive); THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (finding Executive
"[e]nergy" needed for security, "steady administration of the laws,"
"protection of property," "justice" and "protection of "liberty"); Compare
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting power in "a Congress" that "consists of a
Senate and a house of Representatives" and U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1 (vesting
power in "a President"); and U.S. CONSr. art. m1, § 1 (vesting power in a
"Supreme Court" and inferior Courts.").
9 Id. at 1653 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I., § 5, cl.1).
93id.
I' Id. at 1654 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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courts to develop administrative rules to make sure that a federal
court order does not interfere with presidential duties. 95
Justice Breyer agreed that the stay of the trial in this case was
premature because the district court had not yet been presented
with an explanation as to why the immunity is needed.9
However, he cautioned that separation of powers principles
prevent district judges from exercising other than a very limited
power to second guess the President once he does offer an
explanation."
In my opinion, we are unlikely to see how this aspect of the
case plays out because there are so many other issues that remain
to be resolved in this case. I did notice in this morning's New
York Times, that the trial is scheduled for May,98 but I will be
surprised if we see the trial in May, not just because the case may
settle, but because there are many other issues that remain to be
resolved.
Among those issues is whether Paula Jones has stated a viable
cause of action under § 1983. Paula Jones did not bring a Title
VII claim because the statute of limitations had run on that claim.
She asserted her claim under Section 1983, and that raises the
I' Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer is skeptical with
regard to the majority's optimistic view that allowing a civil suit will not
interfere with the discharge of the President's official duties, arguing that it
poses a real danger. Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., concurring).
I d. at 1659 (Breyer, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., concurring).
The great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department consists in giving to
those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must
in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the
danger of attack.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, (James
Madison)).
98 James Bennet, Seal is Placed on Documents in Clinton Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 1997, at A22. The trial is scleduled for May 26, 1998. Id.
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question whether sexual harassment by a government official
violates a federally secured right.99
Some of you may be familiar with United States v. Lanier.'00
Lanier was a case involving horrendous sexual misconduct by a
sitting judge, directed against litigants in his court and employees
in his chambers."' The issue that was presented to the Supreme
Court this year, but not resolved, was whether sexual harassment
of the type practiced by a sitting judge, while literally wearing his
judicial robe, was a right that could be asserted under the
Fourteenth Amendment. What is the source of that Constitutional
right? The Court did not decide that issue in Lanier.
Should President Clinton argue that he is protected by a
qualified immunity, that issue would probably be resolved by
summary judgment motion. If he loses that, he is entitled to take
an interlocutory appeal, followed perhaps by another round in the
United States Supreme Court on that issue. All of this suggests
that he may be out of office by the time any trial is untimely
scheduled.
The third case, Bracy v. Gramley, 02 also involved misconduct
by one in high office, but this time it was a judge presiding over
murder trials. The case establishes a due process right to a trial
presided over by an unbiased judge. 03 The more specific issue
raised in the case was whether a death row inmate who had been
convicted of a triple murder could successfully obtain discovery
pursuant to Habeas Corpus Rule 6 (a), which requires a showing
99 Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1640. See also Harvey Berman and Marcia Coyle,
Jones' Victory May Be Short Lived, N.Y. TmES, June 9, 1997, at A7.
100 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997).
101 Id. at 1222-23. Lanier was convicted of sexual assault of five women
while he was a state judge. One of the most serious assaults was against a
woman whose divorce proceedings came before Lanier and whose daughter's
custody remained subject to his jurisdiction. Id. When the woman applied for
a secretarial job, Lanier suggested that he would reexamine her daughter's
custody, and when she attempted to leave, he grabbed her, sexually assaulted
her, and committed oral rape. Id.
102 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997).
103 1d. at 1797.
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of good cause before discovery can proceed.' Unlike other
litigants, an inmate seeking a federal writ of Habeas Corpus, is
not automatically entitled to discovery, but must establish good
cause. 1
0 5
The discovery that the petitioner sought related to misconduct
on the part of the Judge Maloney, who had presided over his
trial.'36 Judge Maloney had been convicted of very serious
misconduct: conspiracy, racketeering, extortion, and obstruction
of justice. This was part of Operation Greylord, which was a
major federal investigation of judicial corruption in Cook County,
Illinois,'07 which resulted in eighteen judges being convicted of
federal corruption charges."0 8 Apparently, Judge Maloney was
accepting bribes to fix murder cases."' Petitioner's theory of
bias was that if Judge Maloney was accepting bribes to fix
murder cases in defendants' favor, then he had an interest in
securing a conviction in the petitioner's case in order to deflect
101 Id. at 1795-97. In 1976, Congress adopted the Rules Governing § 2254
Cases. Id. at 1797. In particular, Rule 6(a) provides: "A party shall be
entitled to invoke the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of
discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise."
Id.
105 Id. at 1797. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 295 (1969) (concluding
that the broad discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did
not apply in habeas proceedings). However, the Court noted, 28 U.S.C. §
1651 gave the federal courts power to "fashion appropriate modes of
procedure" including discovery, to dispose of habeas petitions "as law and
justice require." Id. at 299-300.
'
06 Id. at 1796.
107 Id. at 1795-96; See United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (7th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 295 (1996).
01 Id. at 1795.
Id. at 1795-96. The Court noted that:
Maloney served as a judge from 1977 until he retired in
1990, and it appears he has the dubious distinction of being
the only Illinois judge ever convicted of fixing a murder
case. Before he was appointed to the bench, Maloney was a
criminal defense attorney with close ties to organized crime
who often paid off judges in criminal cases.
[Vol 14448
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suspicion that he was taking bribes in other cases. ' 1° Those other
cases were tried just before and just after petitioner's own case."'
Petitioner's suspicious also arose because his attorney was
appointed by Judge Maloney, and his attorney was previously a
law partner of Judge Maloney, working in a law firm that had
been implicated in corruption."' Additionally, his attorney was
capitulating rather quickly to speeding this case to trial."'
Despite all of that, the district court denied the petitioner's Rule
6 (a) motion for discovery, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed
finding compelling evidence of his guilt and no proof other than
mere speculation of judicial bias." 4 Judge Richard Posner wrote,
"The defendant must show either the actuality, rather than just
the appearance of judicial bias, or a possible temptation so severe
that we might presume an actual substantive incentive to be
biased."" 5 An awfully difficult standard to meet.
Judge Alana Rover, writing in dissent, characterized Judge
Maloney's courtroom "as justice for sale."" 6  Judge Rover
further stated, "[that] we may no more treat Maloney as an
impartial arbiter for constitutional purposes then a delusional
megalomaniac who locks a judge in the closet, dons black robes
o10 Id. at 1798.
11Id.
1 Id. at 1798. In support of his claim, Petitioner submited a copy of
Maloney's 1991 indictment, App. 16-35, and a newspaper article describing
testimony from Maloney's trial, in which attorney William Swano described an
additional incident where he bribed Maloney to fix a murder trial, but was
uncharged. Id. In addition, Petitioner's co-defendant Roger Collins, in a
supplemental motion for discovery, alleged that co-defendant Bracy's trial
attorney was a former partner of Thomas Maloney. Id. He also attached to
the motion a copy of the United States Proffer of Evidence describing in detail
Maloney's corruption before and after he became a judge. Id.
113 id.
114 Id. at 1794.
115 Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Del Vecchio
v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1380 (7th Cir. 1994) (en bane)
(rejecting a reversal on the mere appearance of bias, relying in part on the
presumption that judicial officers perform their duties faithfully)).
"6 Id. at 696 (Rover, J., dissenting).
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and hoodwinks everyone with a credible impersonation of Oliver
Wendell Holmes." 117
In yet another unanimous decision, the Supreme Court found
that petitioner had established good cause within the meaning of
Rule 6 (a) and could proceed with discovery to support his
judicial bias claim."' Inherent in the decision is the recognition
of a due process right to an unbiased judge."9 Due process
requires "a fair trial in a fair tribunal before a judge with no
actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his
particular case." "zo Thus, if the petitioner can prove that Judge
Maloney's conduct in this murder trial was an attempt to
camouflage his other misconduct, there is no question that such
bias would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21
The unanimous decision in the case is somewhat surprising
given the Court's hostility in recent years to expanding
opportunities for criminal defendants to challenge their
convictions. It is also surprising given the argument made, for
example, in a brief filed by New York State Attorney General
Vacco, and other attorney generals, warning that a ruling in
petitioner's favor could potentially unsettle many criminal
convictions.'2 The outcome in the case is at least likely to affect
five other death row inmates in Cook County. In fact, one week
after Bracy was decided, his co-defendant's case was remanded
for further consideration. 13 To what extent it will affect the six-
"' Id. at 700. (Rover, J., dissenting).
"
8 Bracy, 117 S. Ct. at 1795.
1 9 d. at 1799. The Court agreed with the court of appeals that although "[ilt
may well be that petitioner will be unable to obtain evidence sufficient to
support a finding of actual judicial bias in the trial of his case, [it held] that
sufficient showing, as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6 (a), to establish
'good cause' for discovery." Id.
20 Id. at 1795
121 Id. at 1797.
'" Amicus Brief of Concerted Illinois Lawyers and Law Professors in
Support of Petitioner, Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997) (No. 96-
6133).
3 117 S. Ct. 2450 (1997).
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thousand felony convictions obtained in Judge Maloney's
courtroom remains to be seen.
The final case that Leon asked me to talk about is M.L.B. v.
S.L.J.,24 another due process case. M.L.B. is a very important
equal access to justice case that raises the issue of whether an
indigent can be denied an appeal to challenge the termination of
parental rights due solely to inability to pay transcript costs." In
this case, the two parties were divorced with the father getting
custody of the two children." Three months later, he remarried,
and petitioned the court to terminate the biological mother's
parental rights on the theory that she was behind in her support
payments, and that she had not complied regularly with her
visitation schedule.127 The court granted the request and
terminated petitioner's parental rights."n The petitioner, Melissa
Brooks, was working as a waitress at the time and earning $2.13
an hour plus tips. 29 She filed an appeal, paid the $100 filing fee,
but could not afford the more than $2,300 that was required for
preparing and transmitting the transcript." 0 In Mississippi, where
this case arose, civil litigants have the right to appeal, but they
must prepay costs including a transcript.13 1 Petitioner sought to
proceed in forma pauperis32, but was denied relief because
124 117 S. Ct. 555 (1997).
1 Id. at 559.
12 Id. The couple had been legally married for nearly eight years prior to
their divorce. Id.
11 Id. M.L.B. filed a counterclaim, in which she asked for primary custody
of her children. She alleged that S.L.J. impermissibly denied the reasonable
visitation rights spelled out in her divorce decree. Id.
12 Id. "[Tihe Chancellor declared that there had been a 'substantial erosion
of the relationship between the natural mother, [M.L.B.] and the minor
children... ."' Id. (additional citation omitted).
12 David G. Savage, People's Court: Ruling for a Mother's Right Puts
Human Face on Supreme Court's Work, 83 A.B.A. 1. 40 (1997).0 M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560.
131 Id.
132 Black Law Dictionary defines "in forma pauperis": "[P ]ermission
given to a poor person (i.e. indigent) to proceed without liability for
court fees or costs. An indigent will not be deprived of his rights to
litigate and appeal; if the court is satisfied as to his indigence he may
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Mississippi only affords poor person relief at the trial level, not
on appeal.133 New York is different. New York is one state of
twenty that waives the costs for indigent appellants in civil cases
generally."34 Ten other states do so in cases involving termination
of parental rights. 135
Before discussing the Court's decision in this case, let me
provide a very quick background. When it comes to access to
justice in criminal cases, the Court has held that the state must
provide a free trial transcript to an indigent criminal defendant.
In Griffin v. Illinois,136 the Court held that even though there is no
constitutional right to an appeal, once the state offers the right to
a criminal appeal, it may not effectively deny that right to those
unable to pay. 137  The Griffin rule was extended in Mayer v.
Chicago, 13' a criminal case where the defendant did not face
incarceration.
However, when it comes to access to civil justice, the Court
has been far less generous. In Boddie v. Connecticut,139 the
proceed without incurring costs or fees of court." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIoNARY 537 (6th ed. 1990) (citing FED. R. App. P. 24).
133 Id.
'" Linda Greenhouse, Needy Who Lose Parental Rights Gain In Top Court,
N.Y. TIMEs, DEC. 17, 1996, at Al.
135 Id.
136 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Petitioners, Griffin and Crenshaw, were tried and
convicted of armed robbery. Id. at 13. Seeking full appellate review,
petitioners filed motions requesting a certified copy of the record and
stenographic transcript of proceedings at the trial. Id. They claimed that they
were "poor persons with no means of paying the necessary fees to acquire the
Transcript and Court Records needed to prosecute an appeal... " Id. Both
the trial court and the Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the petitioners without
a hearing. Id. at 15. Petitioners "charge that refusal to afford full appellate
review solely because of poverty was a denial of due process and equal
protection." Id.
137 Id. at 24. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "The State is not free to produce
such a squalid discrimination ... (that) bolt(s) the door to equal justice." Id.
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
138 404 U.S. 189 (1971). Defendants were found guilty of disorderly conduct
and interfering with police officers, both misdemeanor offenses. Id. at 412.
139 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Petitioners comprised a class of female welfare
recipients who were frustrated in their.attempts to initiate divorce actions in the
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Court held that the state may not deny access to the courts for
purposes of obtaining a divorce due to inability to pay fees and
costs.1'4 However, the Boddie decision was based on the singular
importance of marriage in our society and also on the fact that the
state has a virtual monopoly over the means for dissolving
marriages.141 Any thought that Boddie signified some broad
access to justice principle was eliminated two years later in
United States v. Kras, 142 where the Court rejected a claim by an
indigent unable to pay a $50 filing fee to obtain a discharge in
bankruptcy.143 He was too poor to go bankrupt.
Similarly, the Court in Ortivein v Schwab,'" upheld a $25
appellate filing fee applied to indigents who sought to appeal
administrative decisions that affected their welfare benefits. 45
The Court found that welfare benefits, like bankruptcy, simply
have less constitutional significance than the interest implicated in
Boddie."
The lesson to be drawn from these access to civil justice cases,
is that absent a fundamental interest gained or lost depending on
the availability of the relief sought, the Court is likely to uphold
fee requirements that have the effect of preventing indigents from
securing judicial review.
The question in M.L.B. thus becomes whether or not the
prepayment requirement results in the deprivation of a
courts of the state of Connecticut. Id. at 372-73. They brought this class
action to challenge the constitutionality of Connecticut's statute that requires
payment of court fees and service of process fees to gain access to the courts
for a divorce. Id. at 372.
11 Id. at 383. "A state may not make its judicial processes available to some
but deny them to others simply because they cannot pay a fee." Id. at 389
(Brennan, J., concurring in part).
141 Id. at 380-81.
142 409 U.S. 434 (1973). The Court could not find any fundamental right in
the Constitution to declare bankruptcy, and opined that the extension of such a
right should come from the Congress, if at all. Id. at 446- 50.
143 Id. at 450.
14 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
145 Id.
146Id. at 659.
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fundamental interest. 147 Justice Ginsburg, writing very carefully
for a divided Court, concluded that the termination of parental
rights does implicate a fundamental interest, given the primacy of
family relations in our constitutional order.148 That interest was
recognized in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 141 where
the Court held that even though there is no automatic right to
appointed counsel in parental termination cases, an appointment
would be due when warranted by the particular facts or particular
difficulty of the case. 50 The Lassiter Court recognized that a
parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship is an
important one that "undeniably warrants deference and absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection." 1
Similarly in Santosky v. Kramer,'52 the Court held that a clear
and convincing evidence standard is constitutionally required in
parental termination cases, because few forms of state action are
both so severe and so irreversible, and because the parents'
interest is "commanding" and "far more precious than any
property right." 153
" M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 559 (1996).
148 Id. at 565.
149 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Woman incarcerated for first degree murder who
chose not to be represented by counsel in parental rights termination hearing
was not denied any fundamental rights because the case did not involve the
taking away of defendant's personal freedom. Id. at 27.
11o Id. at 31-32.
'-" Id. at 27 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
152 455 U.S. 745 (1982). After certain incidents which indicated neglect,
petitioners, John and Anna Santosky, lost custody of their three children. Id.
at 751. Pursuant to New York's permanent neglect statute, the State must
prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it made diligent efforts to
foster the parental relationship and that the parents failed to have meaningful
contact with the children while the children were removed from the home. Id.
at 748-49. Upon successfully meeting its burden, the State terminated
petitioners' parental rights in the three children. Id. at 751. The petitioners
brought suit to determine "whether New York's 'fair preponderance of the
evidence' standard is constitutionally sufficient." Id. at 750-51.
153 Id. at 758-59. See also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 39
(1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "A termination of parental rights is both
total and irrevocable. Unlike other custody proceedings, it leaves the parent
with no right to visit or communicate with the child. . . ." Id.
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In M.L.B., Justice Ginsburg rests her decision on both equal
protection and due process grounds, and here the decision
becomes a little murky."54 For those of us who struggle to
separate out equal protection analysis from due process analysis,
she offers little guidance besides noting that cases of this order
cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeon hole
analysis."' Instead, she directs us to look at the character and
intensity of the individual interest at stake versus the state's
justification for its exaction. 156 She applies what seems to be a
balancing test, and concludes that the parent's interest in not
having her relationship with her child permanently lost,
outweighs the state's interest, which is merely financial."57
Justice Ginsburg repeatedly stresses in her decision that this
case represents the exception rather than the rule." 8 She takes
pains to reaffirm the general rule that fee requirements ordinarily
are examined only for rationality, and that the state's need for
revenue to offset costs will normally satisfy the rationality
requirement. 59 She even distinguishes parental termination cases
from loss of custody cases, because there, the parent at least is
still able to see and have contact with the child."w In short,
11 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996). "In these cases, '[d]ue
process and equal protection principles converge." Id. (citing Bearden v.
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983)).
155 M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566 (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666
(1983)).
116 M.L.B., 117 S Ct. at 566.
17 Id. at 566.
'58 Id. at 568-69. "To recapitulate, termination decrees 'wor[k] a unique
kind of deprivation.'" Id. at 569 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452
U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
159 M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 567. See also Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656
(1973) (stating the general rule of rationality required to assess fee waivers in
civil appeals cases; rational justification is ordinarily satisfied by a State's need
for revenue to offset court system expenses.). See, e.g., Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that a woman's right to an abortion does not
extend to a right to a state-funded abortion).
160 M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566. "In contrast to loss of custody, which does
not sever the parent child bond, parental status termination is irretrievabi[y]
destructi[ve]' of the most fundamental family relationship." Id. (quoting
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
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parental termination cases represent a "tightly circumscribed
category" of civil cases due to the unique type of deprivation
involved. ,"
Justice Thomas dissented, taking issue not only with the result
in this case, but with the continued vitality of the Griffin line of
criminal justice cases. 62 With respect to the due process claim,
Justice Thomas concluded that petitioner received all the process
she was due because she had a trial, was represented by counsel,
and had the right to confront witnesses and cross-examine
witnesses.163 Inasmuch as there is no due process right to an
appeal anyway, her due process claim necessarily fails.'64 Judge
Thomas spent more time analyzing petitioner's equal protection
claim but, there too, concludes that it affords her no relief. '6
The Equal Protection Clause, he asserts, "is not a panacea for
perceived social or economic inequity."' 16
The dissent warns that this new found free flowing
constitutional right to appellate assistance will not be limited to
parental termination cases, but will be invoked in all sorts of civil
cases, ranging from paternity suits, to custody cases, to divorce
actions, to challenges to zoning ordinances that impact on
families, and even to foreclosure actions that result in evicting
families from their homes. 167
161 M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566.
6 Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "I do not think that the equal
protection theory underlying the Griffin line of cases remains viable." Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
,1 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting)
'64 Id. at 571 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "The majority reaffirms that due
process does not require an appeal." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1 6 Id. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "I see no principled difference
between a facially neutral rule that serves in some cases to prevent persons
from availing themselves of state employment, or a state-funded education, or
a state-funded abortion - each of which the State may, but is not required to,
provide. . . ." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
'6 Id. at 573 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "The Clause... seeks to
guarante[e] equal laws, not equal results." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
67 Id. at 576-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Responding to the Court's
assurances that its holding will not extend beyond parental termination suits,
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Justices Scalia and Rehnquist joined his dissent.'" Notably,
however, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not join that part of the
opinion that calls for overruling the criminal justice line of
cases. 
169
If the dissent is right in predicting that the case will prove to be
a launching pad for the discovery of a host of other rights, then it
may prove to be the most significant yet unheralded, case of the
term. Unfortunately, at least from my point of view, given how
carefully Justice Ginsburg crafted her opinion, the dissenter's
prediction is not likely to prove accurate. In fact, four weeks
after announcing this decision, the Court denied certiorari in a
custody case where a mother could not pay the more than five
thousand dollars required for the trial transcript to appeal a
decision transferring custody of her seven-year-old child to her
ex-husband.' While it is true that a denial of certiorari in itself
does not tell us anything, the likelihood is that the decision in M.
L. B. v. S.L.J. will not be extended to cases of this type. Thank
you very much.
Justice Thomas stated "I have my doubts that today's opinion will be so
confined... I fear that the growth of Griffin in the criminal area may be
mirrored in the civil area." Id. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1' Id. at 570 (Thomas, ., dissenting).
169 Id.
171 See Pope v. Pope, 667 N.E.2d 1062 (I11. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct.
737 (1997).
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